“Seaway was travelling at over twice the speed of Classique & dictated the ultimate relationship between these 2 vessels
Because of the superior speed of Seaway it was not for Classique to avoid the eventual close quarters situation created by Seaway’s superior speed & alteration of course”
This 3rd Submission by Bolton was put to Judge Wylie with further references to the evidence at Judge Davis’s hearing regarding the Risk Management plans Bolton had to avoid the situation created by the Rogue ferry’s alteration of course towards Classique
(a) As Seaway turned at Sth Motuihe, Classique was leaving the area of Nth Browns Island – the distance separating the 2 vessels at that point was 2.5 nmiles – each craft was at opposite ends of that channel between Browns & Motuihe.
(b) Classique was leaving the area where Seaway would be expected to go as it followed its Regular Run. As Classique travelled towards Sth West Motuihe more clearance would be created astern of her for the passage of Seaway which according to Bolton’s bearings was where Seaway was heading.
(c) As Classique proceeded West, the bearing toward Seaway began to indicate that instead of Seaway going around Browns Light, Seaway was tracking towards Rangitoto & Classique but still going astern of Classique
(d) Risk of Collision would not apply before Seaway passed the point where it would normally turn round Browns Island. If Seaway turned any more towards Classique, Bolton was ready to increase speed away from the Rogue ferry because to turn to starboard into the path of Seaway would not be a Seaman-like consideration.
(e) It was Seaway reducing the clearance available astern of Classique. Seaway didn’t indicate any concern, which meant Seaway was happily in charge of the clearance it was giving itself – therefore there was no need for Classique to alter its course or speed to get out of the ferry’s way to avoid something brought upon Classique as the ferry turned towards it instead of turning away at Browns Island to follow the course from whence Classique had come. There was no sound signal from the ferry to indicate any concern the ferry had as to Classique’s intentions.
(f) As Seaway was travelling at twice the speed of Classique it’s easy to work out that in the time Seaway covers 2 nmiles, Classique is going to cover 1 nmile – consequently no one has to be a mathematician to determine that Classique was well East of the track M Pigneguy drew on his evidential chart which had the point of incident 0.25 nmile out from Browns Light. M Pigneguy said he saw Classique crossing from port to starboard as he turned at Sth Motuihe so Classique must’ve been in the Nth Browns Island & Light area at that time & be at least a nmile from that point by the time Seaway travelled the 2.5 nmiles. So if Classique had to be East of the track drawn by M Pigneguy, it stands to reason that Seaway must also have gone East of the track to take Photo 3 showing the clearance M Pigneguy left himself instead of the 463 mtrs available before he steered up from the Course of 286* he said he was on.
(g) “Good seamanship (on the part of M Pigneguy) could have adjusted the encounter to permit the vessels to pass under more favorable circumstances” – Farwell quoting Admiralty
Judge Wylie dismissed Bolton’s submission saying that … “although Seaway was the faster vessel at the time, that is irrelevant.” – Did Judge Wylie even try to consider relevance ?
The point of incident doesn’t square with the distances each vessel covers
given the speeds – Seaway travelling twice the speed of Classique.
Classique must have been East of the track drawn by M Pigneguy
indicating Seaway also went East of its stated track
Photo 3 taken by M Pigneguy with the clearance he gave himself
by turning towards Classique & could’ve adjusted if he had concerns –
this photo has been zoomed by M Pigneguy & alters the appearance
to look closer than that observed from Classique